Our S.O.P. [Standard Operating Procedure] for night security consisted of the hauling up of additional ammunition, hand grenades, and mortar illumination and explosive shells. It also involved the establishment of telephonic communication from all companies to the battalion C.P. as well as inter-company lines. Radio was available in an emergency, and at least one forward observer occupied a front line hole.
It was over the phone that Lt. Col. Lessing first intimated to us that this was to be the most publicized and memorable night of the Saipan operation. (Lt. Col. Lessing had switched from the Engineer Regiment to assume command of the battalion, thus enabling Lt. Col. Brunelli, who had been directing us most of the time following the death of Lt. Col. Schultz, to return to his position as regimental executive officer. Lt. Col. Lessing had been leading us since "D plus 18." He relayed the news that, based on prisoner-of-war accounts, there existed the distinct possibility of an immediate and strong counterattack, and we remained on the alert.
Throughout the night there was scattered fire as an occasional Jap attempted to slip through, or previously unnoticed soldiers and civilians emerged from their hiding places. This was not unusual, but the publicized pattern of the "banzai" attack grew clearer when below us we heard the jumble of many voices around 0400. Soon came the rattle of machine guns and we were convinced that the expected attack was materializing.
In the disposition for that night all the companies were on line, as usual, with "A" on the left, "C" in the middle, and "B: on the right--all companies well-stocked with ammunition, although it hadn't arrived until after nightfall. The graying dawn showed us just on the fringe of the attack whose main effort was directed along the low level ground toward Tanapag. Mortars, 37s, grenades, machine guns, and small arms stopped some 30-40 Nips in front of "C" Company before they could finish their "banzai" as they plunged into a hail of lead. In particular I recall one begrimed squatty nipper, shrieking and arms outstretched, whose guts disintegrated as a 37mm canister shell caught him squarely in the chest not twenty yards from the muzzle of the gun.
On the left "A" Company was piling them up in countable rows of up to six and eight, altogether disposing of close to a hundred. It was the attack we desired to eliminate cave-probing, and we emerged with but four or five lightly wounded men, well pleased at the ratio, and stimulated by our success.
Ours is not the publicized version of this frenzied, last ditch, and sake-influenced rush. The feature story and the main power centered on the flat terrain to the north of Tanapag which was held by some army units. The reasons for it I do not know, but the lines were quickly broken, and the drive was not spent until stopped by elements of the 10th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 2nd Division, who stemmed the remnants of the original 2000-3000 Jap starters.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire."
The 24th jumped off at 0930, continuing to head north. They had not been hard hit by the banzai attack; indeed, they even benefited from it as hundreds (if not thousands) of Japanese soldiers that had held defenses to their front now lay dead in the 27th Division's zone. Of course, the final advance would not be easy - not all of the enemy had participated in the attack, and those that remained were just as full of fight as they had been on previous days.
One hundred and fifty dead Nips was no cause for halting our perpetual motion, and by mid morning of "D plus 22" we were continuing northward along the western slope of the highest ridgeline. By vigorous and sweaty movement we stretched our already considerable lead in the "Marpi Point Marathon" as far as the higher echelons thought advisable, then dug in to await flank support.
In the afternoon we again witnessed the sympathy and pity which is inherent in all of us. While preparing our foxholes, a small patrol scouted out some flimsy shacks to our front. But while on the mission, some had heard the crying of wounded women and children, and the men pleaded for a chance to go out and bring them back. The memory of the ruse which killed Phil Wood and Ervin had not vanished, and permission was refused. Yet the men, fully realizing the possibilities of deception, continued to beg for a chance to go. Finally we relented, and another patrol went out cautiously and retrieved the wounded.
They included a mother, badly hurt, with week-old untreated wounds in which gangrene had set heavily, and three less-seriously wounded children. It was clear that the mother's life was ebbing fast, and that she had forced herself to remain alive for the sake of her children. To us, who offered all possible aid, the tragedy of this pain and suffering of innocent mother and child seemed almost as cruel as the loss of our comrades who understood the fight and were at least partially conditioned to it.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
On its left, the 23rd Marines were still held up by their cliff - the remainder of their advance route lay literally several hundred feet below them, on a coastal plain - so the 2nd Marines were assigned to fill the gap. The 24th and 25th advanced rapidly, outpacing the two regiments on the left. 1/24 encountered a large Japanese gun, cleverly hidden in a cave; the gunners would wheel the piece out for a round or two, then quickly drag it back into the cave before the Americans could respond with counterbattery fire. Eventually, the Japanese picked the wrong moment and trundled their gun out just as an American shell landed in the cave mouth.
As the area available to the Japanese diminished, increasing numbers of civilians surrendered to the Marines. Some enemy combatants disguised themselves in civilian clothing (in other cases, their ragged uniforms were indistinguishable from the clothes the Chamorros wore) and approached the Marines with hidden grenades or sticks of dynamite. The Marines, once bitten twice shy, took the civilians in cautiously.
At the day's end, the right flank had advanced several hundred yards, and were ordered to hold position until further notice. The left flank had barely budged.
The darkness was marked by our first bombing. For many minutes a solitary Japanese bomber cruised back and forth overhead, apparently driven away from the anchorages and their lucrative targets by the anti-aircraft fire and desirous of dumping their bombs with some effect. After a long stretch of waiting the plane finally loosed a string of six which fell some two hundred yards in front of and directly parallel to our lines. With our too-shallow foxholes,the concussion was strong, and although no real casualties resulted, our respect for bombing rose perceptibly.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
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