[NOTE: the interaction with Lt. Col. Lessing is included here because Captain Schechter's account places the incident as happening after A Company had been on Tinian for seven days. I haven't been able to locate any other sources on Lessing's subsequent removal from command, nor have I been able to pinpoint a day or action when A Company lost three killed all at once. Schechter is an accurate source for the most part, but it should be remembered that he was recalling these actions nearly forty years later, and by Tinian he had been commanding his company in a combat zone - if not directly on the front line - for about six weeks with little opportunity to rest. Given the movements of the Battalion, it's likely that the incident occurred either July 31, or possibly August 1 when the Battalion was engaged in mopping up exercises. Either way, it's a great example of an officer going out of his way to look out for the men under his command, and evidently Lessing remained in his position as Battalion commander until the end of the campaign.]
...we had been on the go for seven days, always facing some resistance. We hadn't had any food other than our regular combat rations. I should also point out that we had run into some heavy rain. In short, things were pretty miserable.Nobody liked the look of the cliff that lay ahead, nor did they relish the thought that every remaining Japanese soldier on the island was hidden on the cliff itself or on the wooded plateau.
- Captain Irving Schechter, 1982, quoted in Henry Berry's "Semper Fi, Mac."
Least among those was General Schmidt, who had thus far run a very successful campaign with minimal casualties. If he could, he aimed to keep it that way. Starting around midnight, the Marine artillery lobbed shell after shell into the escarpment, keeping a steady pace until near dawn. Shortly before 0600, the word was passed to all Marines to keep their heads down and cover up. Two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and two light cruisers sent their big projectiles howling over the crouched Marines and into the terrain to their front. The General needn't have worried about keeping the men down; as it turned out the ships fire control was so good (and the target large and stationary enough) that not a single shell fell short, and most impacted directly on target.
The ships pounded the cliff for seventy five minutes. Abruptly, the fire ceased, and in the stillness could be heard the droning of aircraft. One hundred and sixty nine planes - anything capable of carrying bombs, including several based at Aslito Airfield on Saipan - roared overhead and released 69 tons of high explosive, nearly all of which hit the target zone. Marines watched the aviators for forty minutes, as wave after wave made their attack runs. As the planes departed, the Navy started back up. Altogether, the ships sent nearly 615 tons of "outgoing mail" into the escarpment.
At 0830, the ships ceased fire, and now it was the Marines' turn to take the fight to the enemy.
I received a call from headquarters. I don't want to mention any names, but it was from a pretty high source who claimed he was interested in finding out how my men were.
"Just about done," I told him. "Perhaps it's time to pull them out."
"Oh, we're all shot," he answered. "Why, I have a slight touch of dysentery myself."
Oh, my God, I thought, he's back there on the beach with hot rations, coffee, the whole works and he has a slight case of the runs. Tough.
"Schechter," the ranking officer continued, "I have a bet with someone over in the 2nd Division that we will take Tinian before they do."
Now I was thunderstruck. How the hell could anyone make a bet like that, playing with other people's lives? But our orders were to keep going and we did.
- Captain Irving Schechter, 1982, quoted in Henry Berry's "Semper Fi, Mac."
The 23rd and 24th Marines advanced abreast. 1/24 was on the far right flank, next to the ocean. To their right, amphibious tanks bobbed in the surf, ready to lend supporting fire. It would soon be needed, as the battalion ran into yet another well-hidden and strongly defended Japanese outpost. A platoon sized group of Japanese launched a spirited counterattack, and for a while the situation was bloody. Despite the relative ease of the campaign, the Americans were exhausted and under strength, and while a platoon of Japanese did not stand a chance at turning the tide of the battle, they could present a serious hazard.
I won't go into details, but a little later I received orders to go into an area that meant certain disaster. I complained to Colonel Lessing, who sympathized with me, and even tried to get a hold put on the orders but was unsuccessful.
I started to execute these orders, but the first three Marines in line were immediately killed. That was enough for me. I had the three bodies put in ponchos and sent word back that I just didn't have the clout to go any further.
Shortly after this Colonel Lessing showed up. He spotted the ponchos.
"Buck," he said, "what's this?"
"Colonel," I answered, "that's the bodies of the first three men who tried to move into the area I told you about. We just don't have to end up putting what's left of my company into ponchos because someone back on the beach is a nut."
So Colonel Lessing picked up the phone and called back to the beach. He was obviously asked how things were going where we were.
"Not so good," he said. "I'm staring at three Marines who are covered with ponchos because of that stupid order I tried to get changed. I hate waste."
- Captain Irving Schechter, 1982, quoted in Henry Berry's "Semper Fi, Mac."This action would eventually cost Lessing his command.
By 1100, the Japanese were all dead. One company of 1/24 was detached to perform mop-up duties, aided by several flamethrower tanks who dealt with hidden enemy riflemen by setting their cover on fire. (The ground on the right flank was composed mostly of coral outcroppings and thick underbrush, providing excellent concealment for the Japanese and making passage for tanks very difficult.)
3/24 encountered light resistance until 1600, when massed machine gun fire stopped them in their tracks. They called for armor support, but it was found that the area was heavily mined, and the tanks and halftracks could not proceed. It took the engineers 45 minutes to clear enough mines to allow for an advance, but by this point it was getting late in the day, and the Marines needed time to prepare their defenses for the evening - being so close to the end of the island, a counterattack was judged very likely - and the regiment halted for the day and dug in.
The 23rd ran into stiff opposition as well, including fire from a large caliber weapon (thought to be a 5-inch gun) that temporarily held up 1/23. There was little room to maneuver, and the gun wasn't visible, making the commitment of armor unwise. Riflemen, acting on their own volition and without orders, moved forward one at a time in short dashes, attempting to get close enough to locate the weapon. It was only when two of the supporting tanks received six rapid hits apiece (somehow, they were still operational) that the gun was spotted, smoke dropped, and the American tanks got their revenge on what turned out to be a 47mm antitank gun and 20 Japanese soldiers. 2/23 lost a tank in their zone of action, and while the crew was evacuated, enterprising Japanese got into the machine and began peppering the Marines from their new metal bunker. It was swiftly destroyed by other American tanks.
Although the advance had been smaller than those on previous days, some companies in the 4th Division had managed to climb to the top of the cliff, and were looking out at a broad, flat plateau. While they had certainly made a dent in the Japanese position, they were extremely vulnerable to counterattack; furthermore, nobody could locate the 2nd Division on the left.
The 2nd Division had made some attempts at scaling the sheer face of the cliff, but had been stopped either by hidden Japanese or by the terrain itself. Their only option appeared to be the road that switchbacked up the center of the escarpment. It stood to reason that the Japanese knew this, too, and withering fire was poured on the Marines as they struggled up the slope. First one platoon, then another gained the summit, though, and it was decided to risk reinforcing their position with little more than an hour of daylight remaining.
By nightfall, three battalions had reached the top, and they were frantically trying to prepare some semblance of a defense. It had been impossible to dig in while light remained, as the volume of incoming fire caused too many casualties. The Marines waited anxiously, and as soon as the rifle fire petered out, began digging for all they were worth. Without time to coordinate their efforts, and with Japanese mortars and machine guns making their presence known, the Marine line was scarcely a solid position. They "could feel a counterattack in the very air," as Carl Hoffman put it. Tanks failed to reach the summit as one hit a mine; the open halftracks were vulnerable to mortars, and wire-stringing details took so many casualties that Marines simply passed a roll of wire from foxhole to foxhole and shoved the barbs out to about 10 feet in front of their positions.
Then the counterattacks began.
At 2300, yelling Japanese hit the line between the two battalions of the 8th Marines. Fortunately, interlocking machine guns and 37mm cannon loaded with canister broke the attack. Further probes from the front were also repulsed - but there were still gaps in the line, which made attack from the rear a very real possibility.
Corporal Howard Eugene Smith
Private William Jacob Rewerts.
Total: 2
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