D+9

June 24, 1944

0800 saw the 4th Marine Division changing direction once again. While the other divisions would continue north, the Marines swung to the east to clear the protuberance of Kagman Peninsula. The 23rd immediately ran into a strong pocket of resistance, likely composed of the surviving defenders of Hill 600 and the remnants of the attacking force from the night before. It would take nearly four hours to eliminate the Japanese.

Meanwhile, the 24th raced ahead. The terrain of the peninsula was much flatter than inland, which was a relief to men who were all feeling the effects of physical, mental, and emotional strain caused by nine days of fighting. The area had large numbers of sugarcane fields (Saipan's primary industry was the production of refined sugar) which presented their own, unique set of dangers:

The terrain here consisted of countless cane fields--one after another. And it was the same old story: in every field the company would lose a man or two. It was wonderfully quieting to the nerves to start into a growth of head-high cane, and wonder who would not be coming out on the other side! The Jap snipers who were doing the damage were dug in so deeply, and camouflaged so well, that it was impossible to locate them before they fired. And then it was too late; you were right on top of them, and they had nailed another one of your men--or maybe you! Then there was always that next cane field up ahead. . . .

Some of the fields had been burnt out by the napalm-bombing of our planes. This gave us greatly increased observation as we went through them, but clouds of choking dust arose from the ashes to plague us and dirty our weapons. With water so scarce, one of our chief sources of liquid sustenance was sugar cane juice. We'd whack off a segment of the cane with our combat knives, then chew and suck on it till only the dry fibers were left. In these burnt-out fields we weren't even able to do this, as the cane was spoiled and tasted lousy.

- unidentified platoon leader, quoted in John Chapin's "Breaching the Marianas."

The water problem was very real, and becoming serious. Saipan has very few natural sources of drinking water. The island produced very little in excess of what would be needed by the population, and the chief source of drinking water was rain that was collected and stored. With many thousands of Marines on the island, local sources could not possibly keep up, and supplies could not always reach the front lines reliably.

All this time the sun was broiling down on top of us. Our canteens had been empty for hours. Everyone was absolutely parched. . . . Finally we did stop, as the effects of heat exhaustion and lack of water started to become apparent. [Our company commander] arranged for some water to be brought up to our position. When the cans arrived, everyone crowded thirstily around, and we had to order the men to disperse. . . . Then each platoon leader rationed out a can of the precious liquid amongst his men. As was the age-old Marine tradition, we waited till all our men had their share before we took ours. The water was lukewarm, rusty, and oily as it came out of the cans, but it still tasted like nectar!

- John Chapin, "Breaching the Marianas"

Eventually, all three battalions of the 24th were committed to the advance. 2/24 located an abandoned roadblock that still required a halt of several hours while engineers from the 20th Marines cleared the road for vehicles. A hairpin turn in the road slowed the tanks still further, but the Marines continued towards Laulau Village. The day's major event occurred on the outskirts of Laulau; a blockhouse in the vicinity of E Company suddenly and violently exploded, taking twenty Marines with it. Veterans of the Namur campaign doubtless flashed back to the massive explosion of February 1, which had decimated Second Battalion. While they were recovering, one of the supporting flamethrower tanks hit a mine and was put out of action. That was enough for one day, and the 24th Marines dug in, anchoring their right flank to the beach near Laulau.

The 23rd Marines, to the right, had overwhelmed the Japanese in their front by 1200 and advanced along the peninsula as well, keeping pace with the 24th as best they could. They faced more resistance, but managed to tie in the the 24th Marines. However, the Army was not advancing on schedule, despite Holland Smith's angry proclamation:

Commanding General is highly displeased with the failure of the 27th Division on June Twenty Third to launch its attack as ordered at King Hour and the lack of offensive action displayed by the division in its failure to advance and seize Objective O-5 when opposed only by small arms and mortar fire. The failure of the 27th Division to advance in its zone of action resulted in the halting of attacks by the 4th and 2d Marine Divisions on the flanks of the 27th in order to prevent dangerous exposure of their interior flanks. It is directed that immediate steps be taken to cause the 27th Division to advance and seize objectives as ordered.

- Message received by Gen. Ralph Smith, CO 27th Division

By the time they halted for the night, the 23rd Marines had their left flank swinging in the breeze. A huge gap - 800 to 1,000 yards - lay between them and the nearest Army unit. 1/23, the Division reserve, was sent to hold Hill 600 and close the dangerous hole.

The 27th Division was in bad shape. The 165th Infantry made only small gains, while the 106th remained virtually stationary, despite strongly worded messages from General Ralph Smith:

Advance of 50 yards in 1½ hours is most unsatisfactory. Start moving at once.

Your failure to maintain contact with unit on your left is most embarrassing. Advance on your left at once.

Holland Smith (the two Smiths were not related), decided that the fault lay with the commander of the 27th Division. In what would prove to be an extremely controversial and bitterly divisive move, Holland Smith demanded and was granted permission to relieve Ralph Smith of his command. The Marine general felt that Ralph Smith "lacked fighting spirit" and late in the afternoon of June 24, Major General Jarman arrived at the division command post, took over from Ralph Smith, and prepared to get the division moving on the next day.

The night was quiet for the 4th Marines. 2/24 reported single Japanese infiltrators moving along the beach, and dealt with them individually.

ABLE COMPANY CASUALTIES, JUNE 24, 1944None.