A morning survey showed that we were fully as fatigued as on "D plus 3". Looking a the three rifle companies; Captain Schechter had four effective officers in "A" Company (two of the slightly wounded), and Captain Cokin and Parks in "B" and "C" had but two each. Therefore on the morning of "D plus 8" I joined "C" Company to replace Lt. Tom Schultz who had been killed by artillery the preceding afternoon on Hill 700. And the casualty ratio among the men was as heavy as that indicated in the officers.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
The front line continued pressing northward. The 4th Division advance began at 1000, with the 23rd and 24th Marines attacking abreast. 2/24, on the very eastern coast, made the best progress of the day, encountering only slight fire from Japanese troops on Hill 600. The battalion hit the O-5 line by midafternoon, while 1/24, trailing in reserve, kept a watchful eye for any bypassed enemy troops.
Once again having reached the point of exhaustion we received aid, and for the first time went into relief, remaining as located for the day, and devoting it entirely to eating and sleeping.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
As the line stretched west, though, problems developed. 3/24 constantly kept an eye on their left flank as the 23rd Marines pushed along towards Hill 600. 2/23 had a brisk day as Hill 600 lay directly in their sector, and presented an extremely steep slope that was difficult to scale under the best of circumstances. Japanese defenders hurled hand grenades and sniped at the Marines, and for thirty minutes the situation was touch-and-go as the defenders made the most of their position. When the 23rd gained the summit, they discovered that they were not the first Americans to reach this point. The bodies of several Marines lay where they had fallen the previous day; one of 3/24's patrols that had not returned from scouting the day before.
As 2/23 set up a defensive perimeter and kept lobbing grenades at Japanese troops still holding onto the northern slope, Lt. Colonel Dillon, the CO, had a clear view of the surrounding terrain. To his surprise and dismay, he noticed that his left flank was in the air - the infantry of the Army's 27th division were lagging far behind, held up by fierce resistance in the aptly named Death Valley. The 23rd was ordered to hold up their advance until contact could be reestablished with the 27th Division, and the Marines dug in on the summit of their hill - all the while trading fire with Imperial troops concealed in the thick foliage to their front.
...we were heartened by our first real sight of the reserve Army division. Having apparently finished with their assignment on Nafutan Point, seemingly endless lines of dusty "dogfaces" came trudging up the winding road. We quickly learned that they were to take over a sector of the high ground between the two Marine divisions (the 2nd on the west and the 4th on the east coast) thus shortening our frontage in proportion to our effectives.
Marine "love," "admiration," and "respect" for the army is well known in all the branches of the service, but on that day the appearance of the soldiers brought nothing but thankful smiles to our faces. Combat is a quick leveler of many differences, and whenever we worked directly in conjunction with the army troops we had no complaint.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire."
On the far right flank, the situation was much the same - the 2nd Marine Division leaped forward, only to run out of contact with the Army troops in the center. The relatively straight line had by this point taken on a significant U-shape, with the 27th Division down at the bottom, and a mixture of Marines and the flanking Army units making up the sides. This added a great deal of distance that now needed to be covered, lines were stretched thin, the Marines couldn't continue to advance until the units on their flanks caught up, and what was worse were taking enfilading fire and infiltrators from the sector that should have been covered by the doggies in the 105th and 165th Infantry.
Howlin' Mad Smith was furious with what he considered to be a dismal performance on the part of the Army, and made no bones about who he thought was to blame.
. . He [Holland Smith] outlined to me the many things that had happened with respect to the failure of the 27th Div to advance. He indicated that this division had suffered scarcely no casualties and in his opinion he didn't think they would fight. He asked my advice. I could give him none because I didn't feel it was up to me to make any recommendation or make any decisions for him. He stated that if it was not an Army division and there would be a great cry set up more or less of a political nature, he would immediately relieve the division commander and assign someone else. After discussing the matter with me he asked me to go see General Ralph Smith, the Div Commander and see what I could do in helping this division to move forward. I immediately proceeded to the Hq. 27th Div and waited until General Smith returned at about 1845. I found that General Smith had been up to the front lines all afternoon and was thoroughly familiar with the situation. I talked to General Smith and explained the situation as I saw it and that I felt from reports front the Corps Commander that his division was not carrying its full share. He immediately replied that such was true; that he was in no way satisfied with what his regimental commanders had done during the day and that he had been with them and had pointed out to them the situation. He further indicated to me that he was going to be present tomorrow, 24 June with this division when it made its jump-off and he would personally see to it that the division went forward. I explained my interest in the matter was that I was senior Army commander present and was anxious to see that the Army did its job as it should be done. He appreciated the situation and thanked me for coming to see him and stated that if he didn't take his division forward tomorrow he should be relieved.
- Major General Sanderford Jarman, Saipan Garrison Force Commander, quoted from Carl Hoffman.
The day was not yet over. The beleaguered Army soldiers got no rest that evening, as two Japanese counterattacks slammed into their lines, each supported by tanks. The Army stopped the attacks, but one tank in the second wave broke through the line and set an ammunition dump on fire before finally being eliminated. The left flank of the 23rd Marines came under fire as well, and while that attack was also broken up, individual groups of Japanese raced at the American lines, causing some small havoc but never breaking through.
Although the combat efficiency of the Division had been seriously lessened by casualties and physical exhaustion, morale of troops continued [to be] generally excellent.
- 4th Marine Division Report on Saipan
Wounded:
PFC James L. De Nicola
Total: 1
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