Artillery and mortar fire had ceased to bother save for an occasional round from a distant gun or the inevitable "shorts" from our own batteries, and we acquired an appetite for the green star clusters which indicated the "shorts" and brought a cessation. But "D plus three" morning showed our strength further depleted and we were unrestored physically. Moreover this day, while not endangering the success of the invasion, lowered us to the point where we were so weakened as to be ineffective as a striking force.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
The 4th Marine Division continued their advance toward the O-3 line. Once reached, the island of Saipan would be split in half, and the Japanese forces divided.
Before they could move out, though, the 23rd Marines had to take their portion of the O-2 line. 3/24, still attached to the 23rd, began to move forward at 0730. Luck was against the 23rd, however, and after advancing only 200 yards they were brought to a halt by machine guns. Incoming mortar fire made it impossible to determine the precise location of the Japanese, and the 23rd was halted 400 yards short of O-2.
It seemed that the 23rd could not catch a break. Not only had they met with stronger opposition than the other regiments of the division, but it was briefly believed that the Japanese had unleashed the first gas attack of the War against their second battalion. A halftrack sporting a 75mm cannon had fired into a cave and immediately a billowing yellow cloud rolled out and enveloped the men. Many Marines had long since dumped their gas masks - veterans had used them only when disposing of corpses, and recruits had been advised to lose the excess weight. The panic reached as far back as the division command post: gas alarms were sounded and a lieutenant burst in on the commanding general, demanding to know if he had an extra gas mask. An analysis of the mystery gas showed it to be relatively harmless piric acid, and aside from two men who had to be relieved due to nausea, none were harmed - though, for a few days, those Marines who could scrounge up gas masks treated them like solid gold.
The 24th ran into trouble as well. Although their assault kicked off as planned, they were attacked by a pair of Japanese tanks who clattered to within 350 yards of their front line. The two tanks hit at a particularly fortuitous time; the regiment's tank support had withdrawn to refuel and rearm. Bazookas and artillery eventually drove the tanks off (the Regiment's weapons company - not yet disbanded by the reorganization, evidently, according to Maj. Hoffman - arrived too late to participate in the attack) but the regiment suffered 15 killed and wounded.
Captain Stott, acting as regimental liaison to the armor support, had an eventful day:
Personally the day will ever be vividly remembered. While the battalion stood fast in position throughout the morning, I resumed tank liaison work (this time in the more lightly armored LVTA's) and we furnished heavy fire support on the cliff while units of infantry advanced along the sugar cane-covered field on top.
For diversion I rode that morning in a gunner's pit and managed to sandwich in some enjoyable machine gun firing. Once when the troops on top seemed to be lagging, I climbed out on top of the tank and semaphored to find out the cause for delay. After considerable wig-wagging, we received an answer so I climbed back in and resumed firing. It wasn't until we pulled back out, the motors were cut, and we could talk again, that another tankman pointed out three bullet marks on my protective gun shield where a sniper had barely missed his target. From then on I semaphored less conspicuously.
A sizable gain was achieved in the morning, and by midday the covering armor shifted up to the fields on top. Opposition was sporadic, but locating and eliminating the Japs in the cane was a difficult dangerous job which held down the rate of progress.
Sugar cane proved a serious hindrance throughout the campaign. The majority of the fields had been fired by the planes and naval gunfire, but the burned stalks remained, and vision in such fields is limited to thirty yards and movement is greatly impeded. Further, the Japanese, the world's most proficient excavators, clung to well camouflaged positions and spider traps. It is necessary for only a handful of soldiers to hole up in in these while the attackers sweep by,and then to suddenly open fire either on the troops just passed or on the oncoming support, to disrupt the assault and cause consternation. The enemy is well versed in such tactics.
As on the previous afternoon we organized another tank-in-infantry attack, this time on a smaller scale and with more limited objectives. All went well, the objective was reached, and most of the troublesome spots in the cane field were overrun. It wasn't until we turned back from the consolidating infantry that disaster struck. In some way the Japs that we were driving up the southern slopes of Tapochau had communicated with and undamaged gun position on Nafutan Point. Hence while the infantry on the ground underwent a light tank counterattack with much automatic weapons fire from the front, our own tanks were taken under fire by the large caliber weapon on Nafutan.
In the tanks we were returning with open hatches when the fire commenced, so the hatches then slammed shut instantly. The shooting was top-notch, and with the first three rounds, three amphibious tanks in a row suffered hits and stopped. Ours was the third in line, was struck in the back, disabled, and set ablaze. Given the word by the tank commander to abandon the tank, we flipped open the hatches and leaped, all in one motion, and despite what seemed like a hail of machine gun bullets we landed safely in a ditch. Weaponless all, we took turns running from cover to cover, and by these short dashes we eventually made out way to safety. Meanwhile alert gun crews on medium tanks and half-tracks spotted the damaging gun and knocked it out.
Somewhat dazed, I was shortly transported to the battalion Aid Station, where several liberal doses of Doc Porter's Nipponese whiskey proved a quick restorer.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
The 25th Marines reached the coast, severing the connection between Japanese forces and enabling the Marines to shift their front to the north instead of the east. 1/25 was given the job of clearing a heavily defended system of caves bypassed by the 24th. Coordinated attacks were impossible; the caves had to be cleaned out one by one by individual teams carrying flamethrowers and satchel charges. The nerve-wracking work required Marines to crawl over jagged rock that tore their dungarees and cut through the soles of their boondockers, knowing that at any moment they could be met by enemy gunfire fired point-blank from hidden crevices. Scenarios like this would be repeated and repeated in the coming weeks.
Nightfall on June 8th brought scattered sniper fire and infiltrators.
At the C.P. the incoming reports were many, vague, and indicative of confusion. Some of these messages indicated a casualty rates in some of the companies, which, if true, meant that only a handful remained of those who had landed three days earlier. The enemy counterattack was repulsed, but as another battalion C.P. streamed back through our own, we followed suit (as did our 81mm mortar platoon due to a misunderstood order) and retired with them to a more defensible spot.
Night fell on this combined two-battalion command post which had no true or clear picture of the front, and which itself had little organization until well after dark. And the rifle troops themselves were in no condition to repulse a determined "banzai" charge. Fortunately enemy losses and effective and heavy fire from supporting artillery safeguarded the front and stopped any such plan in its inception.
These first four days constituted a distinct phase of the battle. In them we secured sufficient land to enable supplies and supporting weapons and troops to be brought ashore and deployed satisfactorily. Furthermore an excellent airfield had been overrun and our own fighter planes were ready to use it and thus furnish constant direct support.
Our air cover was magnificent, and in the front lines we suffered no attacks, although we witnessed the nightly nuisance raids on the shipping at anchor off Charan-Kanoa. We saw a few enemy craft knocked down, including one night raider which appeared over Nafutan Point like a flaming meteor and then exploded with a tremendous roar and brilliant flash that lighted Saipan Channel and the islands on each side. On but two days did we miss this overhead support, when the fleet departed to pursue the Japs in the celebrated Philippine Sea "turkey shoot" which decisively thwarted any naval intervention. And our artillery was well-positioned, furnishing us with fire which could be employed both offensively and defensively.
- Captain Frederic Stott, 1/24, "Saipan Under Fire"
5,000 Marines and an unknown number of Japanese had been killed or wounded in a fight that was only three days old.
Wounded:
Sergeant Carl F. Schott
Total: 1
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